Comments

ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR
THEIR CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES?

The policy of the law is to require the disclosure of all information by witnesses in order that justice may prevail. The granting
of a privilege from such disclosure constitutes an exception to that
rule.'
INTRODUCTION

In Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 2 a3

federal district court recently ruled that an academic researcher
need not disclose information obtained under a pledge of confidentiality. The decision in Richards is notable in two respects.

1. People ex tel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1935).
2. 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal 1976).
3. Though referring to the academic researcher,the Richards court does
not define the term. As used in this Comment, the term refers to academicians and scholars who engage in the scholarly investigation and analysis
of the policy considerations of public issues with a view towards dissemination in a wide variety of media, including pamphlets, monographs, and
books. Some commentators have adopted the term public scholar to describe such individuals. Note, The Public Scholar and the First Amendment: A Compelling Need for Compelling Testimony?, 40 GEO. WAsH. L.
Rnv. 995, 1010-11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Public Scholar]. However, this Comment retains the use of academic researcher for clarity inasmuch as it is used by the Richards decision.
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First, it clearly recognizes a public interest in protecting the confidential relationships between academic researchers and their
sources of information. 4 Second, though not answering the question of whether the public interest warrants a constitutional privilege, the decision relies heavily on cases involving the newsman's
qualified first amendment privilege in civil litigation. 5
The last two decades' have witnessed a continuing controversy
over whether the Constitution's free press guarantee7 protects

newsmen from legally compelled disclosure of confidential information sources.8 The jailing of four California newsmen in the late
summer of 1976 for refusing to disclose a source 9 is a recent example
of this controversy.' 0 However, the disagreement has generally
centered on journalists rather than on academic researchers.":
4. See note 31 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 33-36 infra.
6. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958), was the first case in which the constitutional argument that freedom
of the press privileged a reporter to protect and conceal his information
sources was raised. See, e.g., Note, Reporter's Privilege-Guardianof the
People's Right to Know?, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 405, 410 (1976).
7. "Congress shall make no law .. . bridging the freedom ... of the
pres .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. To the extent that a privilege is recognized, it is accorded only for
the protection of confidential information sources. See Gilbert v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 511 (E.D. Va. 1976). But see United States
v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976).
9. L.A. TnIEs, Sept. 4, 1976, pt. 2, at 1, col. 5. Managing Editor George
Gruner, City Editor James Bort, and reporters William Patterson and Joe
Rosato of the Fresno Bee were held in civil contempt for failing to disclose
their source of material leaked from a county grand jury transcript ordered
sealed by a California superior court. Id. The case went to the United
States Supreme Court three times, once on the ground that reporters have
an absolute constitutional right to protect their sources. Id. at 12, col. 1.
See FairTrial--FreePress,Newsmen's Shield Law, 62 A.B.A.J. 119 (1976).
10. The controversy over the existence of a newsman's privilege has generally concerned all instances of compulsory disclosure. However, the arguments for and against a privilege vary depending upon whether the litigation background is criminal or civil. See, e.g., Murasky, The Journalist's
Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REv. 829, 878-915 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Murasky]. The focus of this Comment is upon first
amendment privilege in civil litigation.
11. See, e.g., Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified
Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Goodale]; Note, Beyond Branzburg: The Continuing Quest for Reporter's
Privilege, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731 (1973); Note, Newsman-Source Privilege: A Foundationin Policy for Recognition at Common Law, 26 U. FLA.

Richards is a noteworthy extension of the rationale of those cases' 2
articulating the strong public interest in protecting confidential
relationships which promote the flow of information on matters
of public concern.
The first section of this Comment describes the Richards decision.
As will be seen, that decision reflects the exercise of judicial discretion to ensure that the quest for discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure does not override other important interests. 13 The validity of that exercise is then examined. Finally, the
Comment addresses the constitutional privilege issue left unanswered by Richards.14 It advances the thesis that academic researchers deserve a qualified first amendment privilege against
compulsory disclosure of their confidential sources.
THE Richards CASE
In 1974,15 Harvard economics professor Marc J. Roberts conducted

a research project investigating the manner in which utility companies make environmental decisions. 16 The research, to be used
for a book, 17 focused on the relationship between organizational
structure and decisionmaking.' s During his research, Professor
L. Ruv. 453 (1974); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg
v. Hayes: Whither Now?, 64 J. CPnv. LAW & CRim. 218 (1973); Comment,
Newsmen's Privilege Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First
Amendment in Jeopardy, 49 TuL. L. REv. 417 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
The First Amendment in Jeopardy]. However, the controversy has occasionally spilled over beyond the bounds of the organized media. See United
States v. John Doe (Appeal of Samuel L. Popkin), 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir.
1972) (college government professor); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.,
66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (medical newsletter); United States v. John
Doe (In re a Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Richard Falk), 332 F.
Supp. 938 (D. Mass. 1971) (college international law professor); United
States v. Doe (In re a Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Leonard Rodberg), 332 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971) (public scholar), aff'd, 455 F.2d
753 (1st Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 609 (1972).
12. See United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976); Baker
v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973);
Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Buchanan v. Cronkite,
Civ. No. 1087-73 (D.D.C. July 18, 1974) (order denying motion to compel
answer); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C.
1973); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); State v. St. Peter, 132
Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1973); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204
S.E.2d 429 (1974).
13. 71 F.R.D. at 391.
14. Id. at 390. See note 34 infra.
15. See TRIAL MAGAZINE, Aug. 1976, at 5, col. 1.
16. 71 F.R.D. at 389.
17. TRsmL MAGAZNE, Aug. 1976, at 5, col. 2.
1'8. 71 F.R.D. at 389.
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Roberts interviewed employees of Pacific Gas & Electric Company,
a California public utility.19 In exchange for the interviews,
Roberts gave the company a signed pledge of secrecy. 20 One subject
of inquiry for Roberts' research was a decision by the utility company to install spray" cooling equipment manufactured by Richards
21
of Rockford, Inc., at one of its power plants.
Subsequently, a dispute arose between Pacific Gas & Electric and
Richards over the quality and performance of the spray cooling
equipment, and the utility company withheld final payment.
Richards brought suit in federal court for breach of contract and
defamation. 22 In particular, Richards alleged it had been defamed
by Pacific Gas & Electric employees during their confidential interviews with Professor Roberts. 23 In conducting pretrial discovery,
Richards sought from Professor Roberts the identity of the employees interviewed and the content of their statements. 24 Roberts
declined to disclose that information, and Richards moved for an
order to compel 25 Roberts' research assistant to produce research
26
notes and disclose the identity of the employees.
United States District Court Judge Charles B. Renfrew denied
Richards' motion.2 7 Citing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Judge Renfrew invoked his broad judicial discretion to supervise
the course and scope of discovery. 28 He noted that the exercise
of this discretion often requires balancing competing interests. 29
19. Id.
20. Id. See

TRIAL MAGAZINE,

Aug. 1976, at 5, col. 2.

21. 71 F.R.D. at 389.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 390.
24. Id. at 389.
25. Id. FED. R. Cnv. P. 37 (a) provides in pertinent part: "A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery."
26. 71 F.R.D. at 389 & n.l.
27. Id. at 388.
28. The liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are an integral part of the overall scheme of litigation
in the federal courts. Their scope is unquestionably broad. It is
for that very reason that the application of the rules of discovery
is subject to the supervisory discretion of the trial judge, whose
duty it is to ensure that the quest for discovery does not subsume
other important interests.
Id.at 391.
29. "The exercise of this discretion often requires that the court balance

On the one hand, both the private litigant and the public have a
strong interest in the fair and efficient resolution of civil disputes.30
On the other hand, "society has a profound interest in the research
of its scholars, work which has the unique potential to facilitate
change through knowledge."3 1
Judge Renfrew, however, found the interests at stake in Richards
not easily comparable.3 2 He turned to the cases recognizing a qualified first amendment privilege for newsmen's sources. 33 Judge
Renfrew did not resolve the question of whether the first amendment privileges academic researchers' sources. 34 However, he did
rely on the newsmen's privilege cases for "useful guidelines" in
striking the balance between the competing interests.3 5 Those
guidelines include the nature of the proceedings, whether the deponent is a party, availability of the information from other sources,

and whether the information sought goes to the heart of plaintiff's
36

claim.

EVALUATION OF

Richards FROM

THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

The Extent of the Discretion to Deny Discovery
The pre-trial discovery provisions 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure serve as a device for ascertaining the facts actually
the interests of the private litigant in obtaining the information sought
against the costs of providing it." Id. at 389.
30. Id.
31. [S]ociety has a profound interest in the research of its scholars,
work which has the unique potential to facilitate change through
knowledge. Counsel... have produced an impressive series of affidavits from scholars throughout the country attesting to the necessity of maintaining confidential relationships if their research is
to be accomplished. Much of the raw data on which research is
based simply is not made available except upon a pledge of confidentiality. Compelled disclosure of confidential information would
without question severely stifle research into questions of public
policy, the very subjects in which the public interest is greatest.
Id. at 389-90.
32. Id. at 389.
33. Id. at 390.
34. '"Whether the public interest in protecting confidential relationships
between academic researchers and their sources rises to the stature of a constitutional privilege need not be resolved by the instant case." Id. (emphasis added).
35. "[T]he cases involving the newsmen provide useful guidelines for
striking a balance between discovery and non-disclosure: the nature of the
proceeding, whether the deponent is a party, whether the information
sought is available from other sources, and whether the information sought
goes to the heart of the claim." Id.
36. Id.
37. See FED. R. Cr,. P. 26-37.
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in dispute. 38 They promote the fair and efficient resolution of civil
disputes.3 9 In keeping with this purpose, the discovery principles
underlying the Federal Rules are liberal in allowing either party
to compel the other to disclose facts in his possession. 40 A strong
showing of good cause is required before a party will be denied

entirely the right to discovery. 41
Exceptions to the principle of liberal discovery are derogations
from the positive general rule.4 2 Nevertheless, a discovery motion

is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 43 That court may
limit discovery to protect parties and witnesses from annoyance and
excessive expense, and its discretion is necessarily broad. 44 Rule
26(c), in pertinent part, provides:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the
38. See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 26.02[1], at 2662 (2d ed. 1976).
The United States Supreme Court has stated: "Modern instruments of discovery serve a useful purpose ....
They together with pretrial procedures
make a trial less a game of blind man's buff and more a fair contest with
the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
39. See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.02[2], at 2664-66 (2d ed. 1976).
40. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). See
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing
expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiry into the facts
underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.
To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be
compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus
reducing the possibility of surprise.
Id. at 507 (footnotes omitted).
41. "All motions under [Rule 26 (c)] . . . must be supported by 'good
cause' and a strong showing is required before a party will be denied
entirely the right to take a deposition." 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE g
26.69, at 26494-95 (2d ed. 1974). See Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519
F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975).
42. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1396-97
(D.D.C. 1973). The court noted that underlying the right to compel discovery is "the basic proposition that the public has a right to every man's evidence." Id.
43. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 966 (1973). Accord, Apel v. Murphy, 70 F.R.D. 651, 654 (D.R.I.
1976); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 82 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
44. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661, 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).

court ...

may make any order which justice requires to protect

a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense, including
one or more of the following:
45
(1) that the discovery not be had.

The central problem inherent in the discovery rules is providing
a litigant access to needed information without imposing an onerous
46
burden on the party who must provide it.
In Richards the burden and expense on defendant Pacific Gas &
Electric and the deponent were neither onerous nor excessive.
Rather, the court found that the real burden and expense were on
society; disclosure would stifle research into questions of public
policy.47 Richards thus presents the question of whether the trial
judge has discretion to deny discovery when in his opinion the social
costs are too great. In at least two instances the federal courts have
48
answered that question affirmatively.

In Baker v. F & F Investment,40 the Second Circuit held that
a freelance writer for the Saturday Evening Post did not have to
disclose the source for his article about block-busting in Chicago.
An action had been filed charging racial discrimination in housing
that violated federal and state law. The writer was subpoenaed
to disclose his confidential source of information." Judge Kaufman,
writing for the court, concluded that the district court judge acted
within his discretion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

in denying the motion to compel disclosure of the writer's confidential information source. The court balanced the litigants' private
interests against the public interest in non-disclosure. 5 ' He stressed
that freedom of the press is fundamental to our way of life and
that the first amendment tolerates no restraints absent a compelling
state interest. 52 The Baker court noted that compelled disclosure
45. FED. R. Cr. P. 26 (c).
46. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661, 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
47. 71 F.R.D. at 390.
48. But see Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394
(D.D.C. 1973). In McCord newsmen were served with subpoenas for news
material including information from confidential sources. The newsmen
sought protection from the subpoenas under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), but the district court found the subpoenas to be neither unreasonable nor oppressive. However, the court did quash the subpoenas after
finding the information sought was conditionally privileged under the first
amendment. Id. at 1396-97.
49. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
50. Id. at 781.
51. Id.
52. It is axiomatic, and a principle fundamental to our constitutional
way of life, that where the press remains free so too will a people

remain free. Freedom of the press may be stifled by direct or,
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of confidential sources threatens a journalist's ability to secure information. 53 Such disclosure thereby threatens freedom of the
press and undermines values traditionally protected by the fed54
eral courts.
In Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories,Inc.,5 5 a federal district court
applied a balancing test as in Baker. The court denied a motion
to compel disclosure by a medical newsletter of the identity of
people who had contributed information to an article on the drug
Innovar, produced by defendant McNeil Laboratories. Plaintiffs
filed an action against defendant for personal injuries caused by
the use of Innovar. 56 Although recognizing the information's logical relevance and the litigants' right to discover relevant evidence
in civil litigation, 57 the court denied discovery. 58 Noting that no
absolute privilege protects newsmen's confidential sources, the
court found that the policy protecting these sources is sufficiently
strong to warrant exclusion from discovery in some instances. 59 The
Apicella court cited"0 Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
61
Branzburg v. Hayes.
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and
more subtly, by indirect restraints. Happily, the First Amendment
tolerates neither, absent a concern so compelling as to override the
precious rights of freedom of speech and the press.
Id. at 785.
53. Compelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably
threatens a journalist's ability to secure information that is made
available to him only on a confidential basis....

The deterrent

effect such disclosure is likely to have upon future "undercover"
investigative reporting, the dividends of which are revealed in
articles such as Balk's, threatens freedom of the press and the public's need to be informed. It thereby undermines values which traditionally have been protected by federal courts applying federal
public policy.
Id. at 782.
54. Id.
55. 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).

56. Id. at 80.
57. Id. at 82.
58. Id. at 85.

59. The court stated: "No absolute rule of privilege protects newsmen.
Nevertheless, the policy protecting news reporters' sources is sufficiently
close to a privilege to warrant exclusion from discovery in some instances."
Id. at 83.
60. Id.
61. 40&U.S. 665 (1972).

the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords 6with
2
the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.

The Apicella court found this balancing approach to be even more
justified in a civil proceeding than in a criminal case.03
Further, the 1970 Notes of the Advisory Committee state that
"Rule 26 (c) . . . confers broad powers on the court to regulate or
prevent discovery even though the materials sought are [relevant] and these powers have always been freely exercised."0 4
There are "many situations, not capable of governance by precise
rule, in which courts must exercise judgment [with respect to discovery] ."05 Thus, it appears that the federal courts may take into
account the social costs inherent in compelling disclosure of confidential news sources when exercising their discretionary power
over discovery; 6 the social interest in a free press seems to extend
to academic research outside the organized media.0 7 The question
then arises of how the various interests should be weighed in a case
such as Richards.
The Exercise of the Discretionin Richards
The Richards decision rests on factual analysis founded upon
four factors: the nature of the proceeding, the status of the
62. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).

63. 66 F.R.D. at 83. Accord, Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d at 785. Cir-

cuit Judge Kaufman stated for the court in Baker:

If, as Mr. Justice Powell noted in [Branzburg], instances will arise
in which First Amendment values outweigh the duty of a journalist
to testify even in the context of a criminal investigation, surely in
civil cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in nondisclosure of journalists' confidential news sources will often be
weightier than the private interest in compelled disclosure.
Id. at 784-85.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (Advisory Comm. Note, 1970 Amend. to Subdivision
(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 155 (West 1972)). In 1935, when the Supreme Court decided to act under its then recently acquired statutory power to draft rules
for a unified system of law and equity in the federal courts, it appointed
an Advisory Committee to assist it. The Advisory Committee's purpose
was to prepare and submit to the Court a draft of the new Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See 295 U.S. 774, 774-75 (1935). In early 1942, the
Court recreated the Advisory Committee to act as a standing rules committee in respect to amendments to the Federal Rules. See 314 U.S. 720 (1942).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (Advisory Comm. Note, 1970 Amend. to Subdivision
(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 155 (West 1972)).
66. But cf. note 48 supra (federal court in civil action denied claim that
subpoenas requiring disclosure of news sources were unreasonably oppres-

sive under the Federal Rules).

67. This question is discussed at length in text accompanying notes 13957 infra.
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deponent in the litigation, the exhaustion of alternative sources of
the information, and the relationship of the information to the heart
of the claim. Because these factors had been suggested to the court
by the closely analogous newsmen privilege cases, these cases will
now be considered to determine whether the competing interests
in Richards were properly weighed.
The Nature of the Proceedings
The heart of newsmen's arguments for a privilege has been that
forced disclosure of confidential information drives a wedge between them and their sources, blocking the free flow of information
68
to the public which the first amendment was designed to protect.
Controversy over the newsman's asserted first amendment privilege culminated 9 in the much publicized 1972 case of Branzburg
v. Hayes.70 This case involved three reporters who had been called
before grand juries to testify about information they had individ71
Two of the reually received in their capacities as newsmen.
68. Note, Beyond Branzburg: The Continuing Quest for Reporter's Privilege, 24 SYRAcusE L. REV. 731, 731 (1973).
69. See Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law-Freedom of the PressVirginia Recognizes a Newsman's Qualified First Amendment Privilege of
Confidentiality of Information and Identity of Source-Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974)., 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 171, 174
(1974).
70. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
71. The Branzburg opinion involved a trilogy of cases consolidated for
appeal to the Supreme Court as follows:
Branzburg v. Hayes, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. App. 1971), involved Paul
Branzburg, an investigative reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal,
who wrote an article about local drug abuse practices. He was subpoenaed
before a grand jury but refused to reveal the confidential sources who had
provided information for his article. Branzburg raised the first amendment
issue of privilege but later abandoned it in favor of reliance upon Kentucky's newsmen shield statute. Id. at 346 n.1. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals declined to quash the subpoenas, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), concerned Paul Pappas, a reporter for a New Bedford, Massachusetts, television station. Pappas
gained entrance to a Black Panther meeting on the condition he would not
disclose anything he saw or heard inside the building. He appeared before
a grand jury but refused to answer questions concerning his attendance at
the Black Panther meeting. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
declined to quash the subpoena and stated: "We adhere to the view that
there exists no constitutional newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury." Id. at
612, 266 N.E.2d at 302. The Supreme Court refused to disturb this holding.
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), involved New

porters claimed a privilege to withhold confidential sources and information,7 2 while the third claimed a privilege not to appear at
all before a grand jury. 73 All three claims of privilege were based
on first amendment protection of the press to gather and disseminate news and information. 74 The Supreme Court, in a plurality
opinion, held that the first amendment affords newsmen no privilege against appearing and testifying before a grand jury.7 5 Thus,
or qualified privilege
Branzburg seemingly rejected any absolute
76
amendment.
first
the
under
for newsmen
However, as Circuit Judge Kaufman pointed out in Baker,7 7 the
sole issue in Branzburg was "the obligation of reporters to respond
to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer ques78
tions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime.)
According to Judge Kaufman, the Supreme Court had been concerned with the grand jury as an investigating arm of the criminal
justice system. 7° No such criminal overtones color the facts in civil
litigation. 0 Further, Mr. Justice Powell had written a concurring
opinion in Branzburg which many commentators view as the key
to the decision. 8 1 He had indicated that when subpoenaed by a
York Times reporter Earl Caldwell, who had been subpoenaed by a grand
jury to testify about the aims, purposes, and activities of the Black Pan-

thers, an organization he had been assigned to cover. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit quashed the subpoenas, and the Supreme Court re-

versed.
72. Branzburg v. Hayes, 461 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Ky. App. 1971); In re
Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 605 n.1, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 n.1 (1971).
73. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 1970).
74. See Note, Beyond Branzburg: The Continuing Quest for Reporter's
Privilege, 24 SYRAcus L. Rav. 731, 747-48 (1973).
75. 408 U.S. at 667. Mr. Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blacknun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. However, Justice Powell
filed a brief concurring opinion stressing "the limited nature of the Court's
holding." Id. at 709.
76. Id. at 667.
77. 470 F.2d at 784.

78. Id. at 784, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 682.

79. 470 F.2d at 784.
80. Id. In Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1976), the court stated:
In the context of a civil trial, the rationales for forcing a newsman to reveal his confidences are much less weighty than those
involved in criminal proceedings. For example, in such a context,
one cannot validly contend that a newsman is concealing the criminal conduct of his source, or shielding the anonymity of criminal
figures.
Id. at 510.
81. In view of the plurality decision, many courts and commentators
have characterized Justice Powell's concurring opinion as the key to the
decision in Branzburg. See United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373, 376
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grand jury, newsmen are not totally without first amendment
rights to protect their sources.8 2 Justice Powell had noted that
even in criminal cases instances will arise in which first amendment
values outweigh the duty of a journalist to testify. 83 If first amendment "free press" values can outweigh the duty of the newsman to
testify in a criminal case, 84 surely in civil cases the public interest
in non-disclosure of confidential sources will often be weightier
than the private litigant's interest in disclosure.8 5 The newsman's
claim for non-disclosure is strongest in civil actions such as
Richards.
The Status of the Deponent in the Litigation
Although the cases do not shed light on how much significance
courts attach to the status of deponent as a party, the deponent's
status in the underlying litigation is a factor frequently mentioned
in the decisions. However, all courts refusing to compel disclosure
of a newsman's confidential sources in civil litigation found, in addition to the deponent's non-party status, either that the party
seeking disclosure failed to exhaust alternative sources or that the

information was not necessary to his case.8 6 All the cases requiring
(4th Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778,
784 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Gilbert v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F.
Supp. 1299, 1301 & 1302 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397-98 (D.D.C. 1973); Morgan v. State, 337 So.
2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976). See, e.g., Goodale, supra note 11, at 916-17; Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg v. Hayes: Whither Now?,
64 J. CRim. LAW & Cami. 218, 219 (1973).
82. 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 710. Mr. Justice Powell implied that the Branzburg holding
does not compel a journalist "to give information bearing only a remote
and tenuous relationship to the subject of the [grand jury] investigation."
Id.
84. Id. See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); State v, St. Peter,
132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1973); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755,
204 S.E.2d 429 (1974).
85. See Baker v. F & F Inv,, 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Murasky, supra note 10, at 898-99; Note, Reporter's Privilege-Guardianof the People's Right to Know?, 11 NEW ENG. L.
nv. 405, 425-26 (1976).
86. E.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783 (court found other available sources of the information sought; the information did not go to the
heart of plaintiff's claim), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Gilbert v. Allied

disclosure of confidential sources were libel actions in which the
deponent was a party defendant.8 7 However, it is likely that this
factor was subsumed into the inquiry about whether the information sought went to the heart of plaintiff's claim. 8 No civil
court has decided a case in which the newsman deponent was a
party, but in which all relevant factors cut in favor of non-disclosure. Thus, the importance of this factor is unclear.
The Exhaustion of Alternative Sources
The importance of this factor is not readily ascertained. Exhaustion of alternative sources of the information sought is relevant, but it may not be essential for a decision compelling disclosure.8 9 All decisions refusing to compel disclosure found no
exhaustion of alternative sources of information.
However, these
cases also found that the information sought either was irrelevant9 '
Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976) (no showing that the
confidential information sought was crucial to plaintiff's case or that such
information was not practically accessible through other channels); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (parties
requesting disclosure did not show unavailability of information from other
sources); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 1975)
(plaintiff showed no compelling need for information and did not show that
it was unavailable from other sources); Buchanan v. Cronkite, Civ. No.
1087-73 (D.D.C. July 18, 1974) (order denying motion to compel answer)
(no showing of the relevance of the information sought and no attempt to
exhaust alternative sources of the information); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v.
McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397-98 (D.D.C. 1973) (no showing by moving
parties that alternative sources of evidence were exhausted or that the testimony and materials sought went to the heart of the claim).
87. E.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Garland v. Torre,
259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
88. The cases all involved libel suits filed against the reporters seeking
a privilege from disclosure of their confidential news sources, and the courts
in each case found that the information sought was necessary to each plaintiff's claim. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Garland v.
Tofre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Adams
v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
89. See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Baker v. F & F
Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958);
Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976); Apicella
v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Loadholtz v.
Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D.
439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
90. See cases cited note 86 supra.
91. See Buchanan v. Cronkite, Civ. No. 1087-73 (D.D.C. July 18, 1974)
(order denying motion to compel answer).
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or failed to go to the "heart of the claim." 92 Moreover, two cases
held that a newsman's confidential sources should be disclosed
when the information sought goes to the heart of plaintiff's libel
claim, even if plaintiff has not shown exhaustion of alternative
sources of information.9 3 The only safe generalization is that failure to exhaust alternative sources, if coupled with a failure to show
that the information goes to the heart of the claim, will result in
94
judicial refusal to compel disclosure of confidential news sources.
The "Heart of the Claim" Test
Regardless of how a court views the preceding factors, inquiry
into the relevance and materiality of the information will always
be made before a federal court orders discovery. 95 The newsmen
libel cases best demonstrate the federal courts' attitude toward
materiality. In Garland v. Torre,9 6 columnist Marie Torre attributed to unnamed CBS executives a statement describing actress
Judy Garland as overweight. Garland sued for libel and sought
from CBS the identity of the people who had made the statements.
After a futile attempt to obtain the information from other sources,
Garland sought to depose Torre. Torre refused on first amendment
grounds to disclose her source, and the federal district court
held her in criminal contempt. The court of appeals upheld the
contempt citation. 7 Circuit Judge Stewart, writing for the court,
noted that compulsory disclosure of confidential news sources raises
92. See cases cited note 86 supra.
93. In Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court noted that
plaintiff had made no effort to discover the source of Hume's information.
However, it excused such failing with the statement that it would be unreasonable to have plaintiff interview all the United Mine Workers' employees
to discover the source. Id. at 638-39. In Adams v. Associated Press, 46
F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), the district court made no attempt whatever
to determine whether alternative sources of tthe information sought were
available but rather was satisfied with a determination that the information
was necessary to preparation of plaintiff's case. Id. at 441.
94. See Goodale, supra note 11, at 737 & 741.
95. FED.R. CIr. P. 26 (b) provides in part:
(b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as
follows: . . . Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,

not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action ....
(emphasis added).
96. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
97. Id. at 545.

serious constitutional issues.9 8 Any infringement on first amendment rights must be justified by an overriding public interest.9 0
This decision was the first to articulate the requirement that the
requested confidential information go to the "heart of the claim."' 0 0
The confidential information must bear directly on the major thrust
of the moving party's claim. In Garland the identity of Torre's
source was essential to Judy Garland's libel action.10 ' The "heart
of the claim" test is more stringent than a test of mere relevancy:
Unless the information sought is essential to the moving party's
claim, there is no compelling state interest in using legal process to
10 2
compel disclosure.

Garland was cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in Branzburg,1 3 and the "heart of the claim" test has been followed by
federal courts in newsman libel cases both before and after Branzburg. 04 The test has been almost uniformly used by federal courts
dealing with compulsory disclosure of a newsman's confidential
sources in non-libel civil actions as well.101° Thus, information
sought from a newsman about his news gathering activities not
only must be relevant but also must go to the heart of the claim
of the party seeking disclosure.
Did the Trial Court ProperlyApply These Factorsin Richards?
The underlying litigation in Richards was a civil action for breach
98. Circuit Judge Stewart wrote: "[W]e accept at the outset the hy-

pothesis that compulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources of
information may entail an abridgement of press freedom by imposing some
limitation upon the availability of news." Id. at 548.
99. Id.
100. [W]e are not dealing here with the use of the judicial process
to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confidential
sources of news, nor with a case where the identity of the news
source is of doubtful relevance or materiality. The question asked
of [Torre] went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim.
Id. at 550.
101. Id.
102. See Goodale, supra note 11, at 738.
103. 408 U.S. at 686.
104. E.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Buchanan v.
Cronkite, Civ. No. 1087-73 (D.D.C. July 18, 1974) (order denying motion
to compel answer); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex.
1969).
105. E.g., United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976);
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973); Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976);
Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm.
v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
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of contract and defamation. 10 6 Neither the professor nor his assistant was a party to the underlying suit.1° 7 The research was not
conducted with a view to litigation, and most facts were available
to plaintiff through interrogatories propounded to defendant. Thus,
any information the professor or his assistant had in regard to the
breach of contract claim was largely supplementary. 0 8 In short,
the first three factors cut against disclosure. At first glance, the
fourth factor seems to weigh in favor of disclosure; plaintiff
Richards alleged that it was defamed during the interviews between
Roberts and defendant's employees. 0 9 If the allegations were true,
Roberts' information would go to the heart of Richards' defamation
claim. However, Judge Renfrew found the evidence insufficient
to establish a prima facie showing of defamation. 10 Richards failed
to show that the confidential information it sought from Roberts
and his assistant went to the heart of a valid claim."' Thus, all
four factors support Judge Renfrew's determination that Richards'
need for the information was not weightier than the public interest
in maintaining confidentiality. The denial of the motion to compel disclosure of Professor Roberts' confidential sources was a
proper exercise of the court's discretion under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
106. 71 F.R.D. at 389.

107. Id. at 390.
108. The research project for which the interviews were conducted
was not initiated with an eye to this litigation. The central subject
of this action, the events surrounding the decision to discontinue
using the spray cooling system,

. .

. was not a focus of the study.

The factual issues which divide the parties may certainly be resolved without resort to statements made by PG&E employees to
Professor Roberts ....

Any information Professor Roberts or

Lane McIntosh [the research assistant] may have as to the identity
of those PG&E officials who decided to abandon the system and
the reasons for their decision is available to plaintiffs through interrogatories propounded to PG&E. In short, the information sought
is largely supplementary.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
109. Id.

110. "Given the importance of maintaining confidential channels of communication between academic researchers and their sources, the Court will
not compel disclosure absent at least a prima facie showing that Richards
was in fact defamed in the course of the interviews conducted by Professor
Roberts." Id. at 390-91.
111. See Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Cerrito
v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 449 F.2d 306
(9th Cir. 1971).

DOES THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN ACADEMIC RESEARCH WARRANT
A FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE FOR CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES?

Since Garland v. Torre, 112 there has been a continuing controversy over the existence of a first amendment privilege for newsmen's confidential sources of information. Some commentators
viewed Branzburg as a negative resolution of that controversy." 3
However, a growing number of post-Branzburg decisions, both
state" 4 and federal," 5 have recognized a qualified first amendment privilege against compulsory disclosure of confidential news
sources. This recognition is particularly apparent in civil litigation,
in which the qualified privilege will give way only upon a showing
of some compelling state interest.""
Baker v. F & F Investment" 7 was one of the first federal civil decisions after Branzburg. In light of Branzburg, the Baker court
concluded that federal law does not recognize an absolute or con-

ditional journalist's testimonial privilege.1 1 8 Nonetheless, the court
upheld the lower court's denial of a motion to compel the non-party
journalist to disclose his confidential source for an article on blockbusting in Chicago. Baker read Branzburg as limited to criminal
investigations" 9 and noted the adverse effects that compulsory disclosure of sources has on a free press. 20 The Baker court was concerned that freedom of the press not be infringed without a counter112. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). See note
6 supra.
113. E.g., The First Amendment in Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 422; Note,
Beyond Branzburg: The Continuing Quest for Reporter's Privilege, 24
SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 731-32 (1973).

114. E.g., Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); State v. St. Peter,
132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1973); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755,
204 S.E.2d 429 (1974). But see Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294
A.2d 149, aff'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E. 847 (1973); In re Bridge, 120 N.J.
Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
115. E.g., United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976);
Apel v. Murphy, 70 F.R.D. 651 (D.R.I. 1976); Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299
(M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Natl Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394
(D.D.C. 1973).
116. One state interest which might very well be deemed compelling is
that of assuring a fair trial.
117. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). See
text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
118. 470 F.2d at 781.
119. Id. at 784. The court said that "concern with the integrity of the
grand jury as an investigating arm of the criminal justice system distin" Id.
guishes Branzburg from [civil cases] ....
120. Id. at 782.
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vailing compelling interest, 12 1 which it found to be absent on the
facts before it. 12 2

Thus, the Baker court evidently regarded the

123
newsman-source relationship as conditionally privileged.
Despite the Baker court's reluctance to expressly recognize a
newsman's qualified first amendment privilege in the face of Branzburg, a number of lower federal courts have done so. Democratic
National Committee v. McCord 24 followed Baker's lead by denying
compulsory disclosure of confidential news sources in a civil action.
Following the Watergate break-in, the Democratic Party brought
damages actions against the Committee for the Re-election of the
President and others. Reporters for The New York Times, The
Washington Post, The Washington Star-News and Time Magazine
were subpoenaed by the defendants for depositions. They were to
produce documents, audio and video tapes, and other materials relating to the break-in or other political espionage against the Democratic Party. The district court quashed the subpoenas, stating that
the great public importance of the case dictated a finding that the
1 25
reporters were entitled to a qualified first amendment privilege.
To enforce the subpoenas, the court said, might inhibit reporting
about a major political party and people within the highest circles

of government. 1 26 The court found that defendants had not demon-

strated that the information sought went to the heart of their
27

or that they had exhausted alternative sources of the infor[were]
The court concluded that the "scales ...
mation.
claim'

128

121. Id. at 784-85.
122. Id. at 785.

123. See Goodale, supra note 11, at 736.
124. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
125. Id. at 1396. The McCord court distinguished the cases before it from
Branzburg by noting that they were not 'criminal" cases as was Branzburg.
Id. at 1397.
126. What is ultimately involved in these cases between the major
political parties is the very integrity of the judicial and executive
branches of our government and our political processes, for without
information concerning the workings of government, the public's
confidence in that integrity will inevitably suffer. This is especially true where, as here, strong allegations have been made of
This
corruption within the highest circles of government ....
Court cannot blind itself to the possible "chilling effect" the enforcement of these broad subpoenas would have on the flow of information to the press, and so to the public.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See Goodale, supra note 11, at 735.
127. 356 F. Supp. at 1397.
128. Id. at 1398.

129
heavily weighted in the [reporters'] favor."'

The 1975 case of Loadholtz v. Fields'3 0 is in accord. The case
arose in Florida, a state with no statutory shield protection for
newsmen. A newspaper article quoted a couple who claimed they
had been intimidated and harassed when arrested by police. In a
libel action by the arresting officer against the couple, the reporter
was subpoenaed to appear at a deposition to testify about his interview with the couple. He refused to comply, and plaintiff filed a
motion to compel discovery. The court denied the motion and distinguished the holding in Branzburg as being limited to criminal
cases. 131 The court cited McCord as authority that the first amendment affords a newsman a qualified privilege in a civil action when
132
no compelling interest justifies compelled disclosure.
McCord and Loadholtz were recently followed in Gilbert v. Allied
Chemical Corp., 33 an action for personal injury damages allegedly
resulting from contact with the chemical Kepone. During pre-trial
discovery defendant Allied Chemical requested a subpoena requiring a non-party operator of television and radio stations to
produce news material. The court quashed the subpoena,'1 34
holding that newsmen have a privilege not to reveal their confidential news sources in civil proceedings that may be abrogated
only in compelling circumstances. 35 Gilbert refused to read Branzburg as holding that the first amendment offers no protection
to the press from subpoenas. 1 36 Rather, it relied on Mr. Justice
Powell's view that a qualified privilege does exist to protect the
confidential newsman-source relationship. 13 7 In this case, defendant failed to show that the confidential information sought was
crucial to its case or that the information was not practically acces38
sible through other sources.
129. Id.
130. 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
131. "This Court has neither been cited nor has found any subsequent
case which has extended the Branzburg case holding beyond the limited
confines of the criminal justice system." Id. at 1301.
132. Id. at 1303.
133. 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
134. However, the court refused to find a privilege for non-confidential
news information. "Only if material requested directly leads to the disclosure of confidences does the privilege attach." Id. at 511.
135. Id. at 508.
136. Id.
137. The Gilbert court found Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion to
be the "minimum common denominator" of all the views expressed in
Branzburg. Id. at 510.
138. Id.
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Given a qualified first amendment privilege for newsmen, the
question arises of whether the privilege should extend to academic
researchers. The inquiry is twofold. First, does the first amendment's guarantee of a free press extend to academic researchers outside the organized press? Second, do the underlying reasons for
a qualified newsman's privilege warrant extension of that privilege
to academic research?
Does "the Press" Mean Only the "Press"?
No court has squarely held that freedom of the press applies to
academic researchers. However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that "[t]he liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers
and periodicals . . . [but] in its historic connotation comprehends
every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion." 139 Under the first amendment, the relevant inquiry is not
whether the individual asserting freedom of the press is a newsman,
but rather whether the individual performs a function furthering
the social objectives of the first amendment. Thus it is the function
which an individual performs, rather than the medium which he
uses, that is the essential first amendment consideration. 140 At
least one federal court has extended the policy protecting news reporters' sources beyond the organized news media. In Apicella v.
McNeil Laboratories,Inc.,141 the trial court applied to a medical
newsletter the same constitutional free press considerations it found
to exist for members of the organized media. In particular, the
court found that the medical letter performed a first amendment
function by providing valuable information on various drugs to the
42
medical profession and the public.
The Supreme Court itself stated in Branzburg: "The informative
function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the
139. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 3G3 U.S. 444, 452 (1936). In Branzburg
v. Hayes, Mr. Justice White stated for the Court that freedom of the press
is the right of all types of reporters and includes "the lonely pamphleteer
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as ... the large
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods."
408 U.S. at 704 (1972).
140. The Public Scholar,supra note 3, at 1012 n.111.
141. 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See text accompanying notes 55-63
supra.
142. 66 F.R.D. at 85.

present case is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, nov-

elists, academic researchers, and dramatists."'1 43 Academicians play
a special role in the communication of ideas. In order to carry out
144

their task "[t]hey must have freedom of responsible inquiry."'

This should be true even if the activity is only data collection; the
Branzburg majority conceded that news gathering, not just dissemination, is also protected by the first amendment. 1"15 If an academic
researcher is performing a first amendment function, he or she is
entitled to the first amendment guarantees that members of the
press enjoy with regard to their confidential sources of informa14 6
tion.
Because Branzburg rejects an absolute privilege for newsmen, the
courts recognizing a qualified privilege have stressed the underlying
social interests served by maintaining confidential newsman-source
relationships. 147 Thus, the extension of the qualified confidential
143. 408 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added).
144. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See The Public Scholar, supranote 3, at 1017.
145. The newsmen in Branzburg presented a constitutional argument.
They claimed that the right to gather information is protected, for without
such protection the recognized first amendment right to disseminate news
would be hollow. The majority in Branzburg accepted this assertion in
principle and conceded that "without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408 U.S. at 681. Two
lower courts had accepted this argument even prior to Branzburg. Schnell
v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Kovach v. Maddux, 238
F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
146. But see United States v. John Doe (Appeal of Samuel L. Popkin),
460 F.2d 328 (lst Cir. 1972). This case grew out of the federal grand jury
investigations into the unauthorized release and publication of the Pentagon
Papers. Samuel Popkin, a government professor at Harvard and author of
a number of published works on the Vietnam War, was subpoenaed by the
grand jury to answer questions concerning his knowledge of the release of
the papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Popkin refused to answer certain questions,
asserting a first amendment privilege against disclosing his sources akin to
the one claimed by newsmen. The district court held him in contempt, and
the court of appeals affirmed in part. In particular, the court of appeals
denied Popkin's asserted first amendment privilege and stated that the
scholar-source relationship is not covered by the "special canopy of the free
press." Id. at 333. However, the court recognized that the privilege, if it
exists, rests upon the important public interest in a continued flow of information that would be adversely affected were scholars forced to divulge
their sources. Id. The court stated that this rationale falls short of immunizing a scholar from testifying about his nonconfidential conversations and
found in this case that the questions put to Popkin did not call for disclosure of government officials or other "participant-sources." Id. at 334.
Thus, the court of appeals, rather than explicitly rejecting a first amendment privilege for scholars, rejected only Popkin's assertion that the privilege is an unqualified one covering all sources of information.
147. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782-83 (2nd Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
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source privilege to academician-source confidences will depend on
the extent to which they serve the same underlying social interests.
The principal objective of the Founding Fathers in providing for
a free press was to stimulate an interplay of diverse ideas which
would enable the public to act as an effective watchdog over
government. 148 They also believed that a free press would promote
constructive change by providing the public with necessary information on important issues. 149 Correlative to these first amendment objectives is the public right to access to ideas.150 The public
must have facts and opinions bearing on public issues, and the task

of reporting to the public falls principally on journalists of the organized media."5 '
However, with accelerated social change and the increasing complexity of public issues, journalists alone are unable to meet the
great need for in-depth, analytical reporting. 152 In response to this
need, academic researchers and scholars have assumed functions
which were formerly the province of the journalist. 53 Scholarly
research provides the public with historical and analytical perspective on issues of public concern in government' 5 4 and private
148. See The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1009. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court noted: "It is the right of the public
to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas.
. . . That right may not constitutionally be abridged.. . . It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas . . . ." 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). "[S]ince informed public opinion
is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression
or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded
otherwise than with grave concern." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
149. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). See Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1954).
150. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969);
Note, Branzburg Revisited: The Continuing Search for a Testimonial Privilege for Newsmen, 11 TULSA L.J. 258, 260 (1975).
151. The Public Scholar, supranote 3, at 1009-10.
152. Id.
153. Id. The tern public scholar has been adopted by some authorities
to describe those researchers, academicians, and others who engage in scholarly research and investigation of public issues. Id. at n.102. See note 3
supra.
154. In United States v. John Doe (Appeal of Samuel L. Popkin), the
public issue in question was that of United States military involvement in
Vietnam. 460 F.2d 328 (lst Cir. 1972).

industry. 15 5 Academic researchers perform an important first
amendment function by providing information to the public which
the journalists are unable to provide.'" As Judge Renfrew aptly
stated in Richards,the research of society's scholars "has the unique
potential to facilitate change through knowledge."15 7 Thus, the
free press guarantee should extend to academic researchers.
Does the Public Interest Warrant a Privilege for Academic Researchers' Confidential Sources?
The qualified newsman's privilege finds its roots in judicial recognition of the adverse impact compulsory disclosure of confidential
sources may have on the press' first amendment functions. Many
courts, mindful of the first amendment's preferred position in "the
pantheon of freedoms,"' 5 8 have found that compelled disclosure of
confidential sources threatens a newsman's ability to secure information that is made available only on a confidential basis. 150 Compulsory disclosure of confidential news sources impedes first
amendment functions in two ways: by drying up sources of confidential information and by deterring future investigation and information gathering which rely upon confidential sources. 160 Compulsory disclosure of academicians' confidential sources interferes with
academicians' first amendment functions in a strikingly similar
fashion.
Drying Up Sources
A strong argument supporting the newsman's privilege is that
informants will be reluctant to come forward with closely held in155. See Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D.
at 390. The public today is vitally concerned with all areas of energy and
environmental policy, especially as it may be affected by decisionmaking
within the private sphere. See generally Binder, The Energy Crisis, The
Environment and the Consumer: A Solomonian Task, 1 Onio N. L. REV.
215 (1974); Hildreth, The Coast: Where Energy Meets the Environment,
13 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 253 (1976).
156. See The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1010 n.102.
157. 71 F.R.D. at 390.
158. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S.966 (1973).
159. Id. at 782. See Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 508
(E.D. Va. 1976); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (M.D. Fla.
1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (D.D.C.
1973). Accord, Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 756-77, 204 S.E.2d 429,
430 (1974).
160. See The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1012 & 1015; Note, Reporter's Privilege-Guardianof the People's Right to Know?, 11 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 405, 406 (1976); The First Amendment in Jeopardy, supra note 11, at
419.
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formation in the absence of a guarantee of anonymity. 161 That reluctance may be attributed to both the informant's fear that a subpoenaed newsman might reveal his identity under judicial order
and the knowledge that a newsman who does not betray the confidence might go to jail. 16 2 Given that fear and knowledge, the informant may keep the information to himself.1 63 In In re Caldwell,"
one of the Branzburg trio of cases, 6 5 the district court found that
"confidential relationships ...

are commonly developed and main-

tained by professional journalists, and are indispensable to their
work of gathering, analyzing and publishing the news ....
166
Furthermore, a number of journalists submitted affidavits supporting Caldwell's position before the courts. These affidavits stated
that sources often gave information only on the condition that their
identity remain confidential. 1 67 They also stated that sources occasionally refused to provide information because of the fear of disclosure by legal process. 168 Thus, the protection of the identity of
a news source is often essential to the source's willingness to give
information to the press. 169
161. Note, Branzburg Revisited: The Continuing Search for a Testimonial Privilege for Newsmen, 11 TULSA L.J. 258, 260 (1975).
162. Id. See Newsmen's Privilege: Hearingson H.R. 215 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1975) (letter from
Irwin Karp to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier).
163. Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 18, 46 (1969).
164. 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970),
rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
165. See note 71 supra.
166. 311 F. Supp. at 361.
167. The affidavit of Walter Cronkite, a CBS network television reporter,
is one example of the views expressed. "In doing my work, I (and those
who assist me) depend constantly on information, ideas, leads and opinions
received in confidence. Such material is essential in digging out newsworthy facts and, equally important, in assessing the importance and analyzing the significance of public events." 408 U.S. at 730. Affidavits expressing the same general view were submitted by newsmen Gerald Fraser,
Thomas Johnson, John Kifner, Timothy Knight, Nicholas Proffitt, Anthony
Ripley, Wallace Turner, Gilbert Noble, Anthony Lukas, Martin Arnold,
David Burnham, Jon Lowell, Frank Morgan, Min Yee, Eric Sevareid, Mike
Wallace, Dan Rather, and Marvin Kalb. Id. at 736 n.20.
168. 408 U.S. at 736 n.20.
169. Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 84 (E.D.N.Y.
1975). See Gordon, The Confidences Newsmen Must Keep, 10 COLUM.
JouRNALIsm REV., Nov.IDec. 1971, at 15, 19. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting

Although the Supreme Court considered such affidavits as selfserving, 170 a number of courts since Branzburg have found that the
drying-up effect represents a real threat to news gathering.171 The
language in Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp. 172 is notable:
The Court recognizes that to effectively gather information for
the conveyance of news to the public, it is often necessary for
reporters to make assurances either not to identify the source ...
or to broadcast or publish only part of the information obtained,
or both. If a news station or newspaper is forced to reveal the
confidences of their reporters, the sources so disclosed, other confidential sources of other reporters, and potential confidential
sources will be significantly deterred from furnishing further
information to the press. 173
Information lost to the press because of the threat of compulsory
74
disclosure of confidential sources is information lost to the public.
The same considerations apply with equal weight to academic researches and scholars. Scholars, in the course of their studies, rely
to a significant extent on other individuals for information. 17
In
many cases, if the scholar's ties with his sources are severed, no
alternative sources exist for the information sought. 170 Yet, these
ties can be extremely delicate and confidential in nature, readily
destroyed by indiscriminate use of the subpoena power to compel
disclosure. 77 As the facts in Richards indicate, Professor Roberts
was able to obtain the interviews with Pacific Gas & Electric's em-

ployees only by pledging confidentiality. 78

If Professor Roberts

breached his pledge, particularly if to the detriment of Pacific Gas
& Electric, it is unlikely that the company would be a fruitful source
of information for future researchers. Therefore, compulsory disclosure for researchers may have as great a drying-up effect as for
members of the organized press.
in Branzburg, stated that "[w] e can and must accept the evidence ...

that

overwhelmingly supports the premise that deterrence will occur with regularity in important types of news-gathering relationships. 408 U.S. at 736.
170. 408 U.S. at 694.
171. E.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D.
78, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp.
1394, 1396 (D.D.C. 1973).
172. 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
173. Id. at 508. Accord, Gordon, The Confidences Newsmen Must Keep,
10 COLUm. JouRNALIsm REV., Nov/Dec. 1971, at 15, 19.

174. Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Va. 1976).
175. The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1012. Accord, United States
v. John Doe (Appeal of Samuel L. Popkin), 460 F.2d 328, 333 (1972).
176. The Public Scholar,supra note 3, at 1013.
177. Id.
178. 71 F.R.D. at 389.
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The Deterrent Effect
Another argument favoring the newsman's privilege is that compulsory disclosure of confidential sources deters future investigation by intimidating the newsman forced to disclose and other
newsmen who view the compelled disclosure as a threat to themselves.1' 70 Faced with a subpoena, the newsman is confronted with
the dilemma of breaching the source's confidence or being held in
contempt. 8 0 Many newsmen have accepted jail sentences to preserve their sources of information."8 " However, the price of preserving confidentiality includes not only a jail sentence but also the
financial costs of fighting subpoenas in the courts' 8 2 and employers' loss of their news employees' services. 83 The newsman
must choose between obedience to the courts and the ethical
scruple forbidding a breach of confidence. 84 To avoid such a dilemma, some news gatherers may refrain from collecting or publicizing information available only from confidential sources. 185 Consequently, such compulsory disclosure of confidential information
sources chills the exercise of first amendment expression by such
news gatherers. 180 Additionally, the more controversial the subject
179. See Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F.
Supp. 1394, 1397 (D.D.C. 19173); The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1017;
The FirstAmendment in Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 419.
180. Note, Branzburg Revisited: The Continuing Search for a Testimonal
Privilege for Newsmen, 11 TULSA L.J. 258, 260 (1975).
181. Murasky, supra note 10, at 863.

Case law demonstrates that news-

men have been willing in the past to exhaust their legal remedies and then
to go to jail, if necessary, to protect their confidential sources. See Comment, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Right of Newsmen Not to
Reveal Confidential Sources of Information to a Grand Jury, 11 DuQ. L.
REV. 657, 658 (1973).
182. Fred Graham, legal correspondent for CBS News, related that when
he was subpoenaed by Spiro Agnew-a subpoena lasting for only 10 dayshis attorney's bill was twice his annual salary. ABA Csnvt. JUSTICE SECTION,
THE FUTURE OF "NEwSMAN'S PRIVILEGE: The Whither & Whether of Dis-

closure for News-Persons, Aug. 15, 1974, at 13 (comments of Fred Graham).
183. Murasky, supra note 10, at 864.

184. Accord, Gordon, Newsman's Privilege Viewed in Context of Court
Cases, VA. L. WEEKLY, Apr. 19, 1974, at 2, col. 3. Professor Gordon stated
that "threats of punishment usually don't work-newsmen have almost always taken the attitude that a promise of confidentiality must be honored
even at the cost of going to jail." Id.
185. See note 188 infra.
186. See authorities cited note 179 supra.

of the report, the more likely it is that the .newsman will be subpoenaed to provide information.'18 7 Hence, the newsman is inhibited
188
from seeking out sources of information at the outset.
The deterrence argument has been accepted by some courts. In
Baker v. F & F Investment,'8 9 the court of appeals was concerned
with the deterrent effect that compulsory disclosure of the journalist's confidential source would have on other undercover investigative reporting.'9 0 Similarly, the court in Loadholtz v. Fields'9 '
accepted the newsman's argument that his attendance at a deposition would necessarily have a chilling effect on his functioning as a
reporter and thus upon the flow of information to the public. 192 The
chilling effect of compulsory disclosure of confidential sources will
work as harshly on academic researchers and scholars as it does on
members of the organized press.1 9 3 Certainly the academic researcher in Richards'9 4 is in as great a dilemma as any reporter who
is faced with a judicial demand for confidential information. In
each case the detrimental effect is the same-a restriction on the
free flow of information about public issues. 95
CONCLUSION

Shortly after the decision in Branzburg, one commentator noted
that several centuries ago journalists had their ears lopped off for
187. The First Amendment in Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 421. See
Murasky, supra note 10, at 864-65.
188. A number of instances have been documented in which news stories
were cancelled or abandoned because of the lack of guarantee of confidentiality. Some of these cases are as follows:
CBS News had arranged an interview with a woman who said she would
disclose how she had cheated on welfare, if her identity would remain confidential. CBS declined to so promise, and the interview was cancelled.
ABC News declined an opportunity to conduct filmed interviews with the
Black Panthers in their headquarters because the network was unable to
offer a firm promise of confidentiality.
The Baton Rouge State-Times was unable to follow up a public official
corruption story after a key source expressed fear that his newsman contact
would be subpoenaed.
The Boston Globe was unable to continue investigation of official corruption because sources told the newspaper investigative reporters they were
afraid of being identified. THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FsEEDOM OF THE PRESS,
PRESS CENsoRsmP NEWSLETTER No. I, at 5-6 (Mar./Apr. 1973).
189. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
190. Id. at 782.
191. 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
192. Id. at 1300.
193. See The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1015-17.
194. See text accompanying notes 15-26 supra.
195. Accord, The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1023.
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publishing libel.19 6 He contended that today they continue to be
denied the right to hear confidences, although in a subtler way.
However, the trend of post-Branzburgdecisions shows growing recognition of a qualified first amendment privilege for the confidential newsman-source relationship. The privilege is necessary to provide a free flow of information to the public. 197 As Mr. Justice
White stated: "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee."' 9 8
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have the discretion to limit discovery when they find that the costs to society
in compelling disclosure of a confidential source outweigh the
countervailing need for the information. Moreover, the social interest in a free press justifies extension of a constitutional privilege
to academicians who serve valuable first amendment functions.
Society has a profound interest in the research of its scholars who
provide a free flow of information and ideas to its "marketplace."
This interest should not be impaired by the indiscriminate use of
judicial authority to compel disclosure of confidential sources.

HOWARD GRAY
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